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Abstract
Globalization has been identified by many experts as a new way firms
organize their activities and as the emergence of talent as the new
stakeholder in the firm. This paper examines the role of trade integra-
tion for the changing nature of the corporation. International trade
leads to a ’war for talent’ which makes it more likely that an organiza-
tional equilibrium emerges in the integrated world economy in which
control is delegated to lower levels of the firms’ hierarchy empowering
human capital. Furthermore, trade integration is shown to lead to
waves of outsourcing and to convergence in corporate cultures across
countries.
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1. Introduction
Many experts have identified globalization as a new way firms organize their ac-
tivities and as the emergence of human capital as the new stakeholder in the firm.
In the last two decades the world economy has gone through a dramatic process of
reorganization. The reorganization of the world economy has been characterized
by the integration of international trade on the one hand and by the disintegra-
tion of production on the other hand. Trade integration has been reflected in
the increased share of international trade in GDP in developed countries which
almost doubled in the last three decades. Similarly, the disintegration of produc-
tion can be seen in a new way firms organize their activities (see Feenstra 1998).
The organization of production has become global. The international organiza-
tion of production has been discussed under the heading ’slicing the value chain’
(Krugman 1995), ’vertical specialization’ (Hummels, Ishii, Yi 2001, Yi 2003), and
’outsourcing’ (Feenstra and Hanson 1997) in the trade literature. The global firm
produces one input in one location and exports it for refinement to a second loca-
tion. The refined input then gets further refinement in a third location. During
this refinement process, intermediate goods are traded from one location to the
next. Thus, an increase in trade in intermediate goods, outsourcing, and an ex-
plosion of foreign direct investment are all an expression of the new way firms
organize their production.
The spectacular changes in the world economy are accompanied by the reorga-
nization of the corporate sector in industrialized countries. The corporate sector
in industrialized countries has witnessed the break up of conglomerates resulting
in more specialized and ’downsized’ firms. The corporate sector sold unrelated
businesses and expanded into related businesses. At the same time firms elim-
inated layers of middle management by introducing more decentralized decision
making inside the corporation and by empowering workers at lower levels of the
firm’s hierarchy. This has resulted in flatter hierarchies inside the corporation
(Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001, Rajan and Wulf 2003).
But perhaps the most dramatic change in the last decade is that the nature of
the corporation itself is changing. Human capital has become the new stakeholder
in the firm. The enterprise of the past was well defined by the ownership of
physical assets. The boundaries of the corporation was drawn around these assets.
Ownership of physical capital was the primary source of power in the enterprise.
These physical assets required huge amounts of investments which went beyond
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the capacity of management. As a result, the enterprise of the past came to be
owned by shareholders. The resulting separation of ownership and control made
the agency problem between top management and shareholders the central focus
of corporate governance. In contrast, in the enterprise today human capital and
talent rather than its plants and machines are the critical assets. Improvements in
financial markets have made it easier to finance large investments, so the capital
intensity is no longer the critical asset of the firm. In today’s enterprise, specialized
human capital has to create ideas how to do things differently to survive an
increasingly competitive environment. Innovative and customized deals are the
source of profits today. Thus, the enterprise’s talented workforce has become an
important source of value to the firm. But this raises new problems of corporate
governance. Today’s enterprise is no longer a stable entity. In contrast to its
machines the firm cannot own its talented workforce. Human capital is mobile
and can leave taking with it the firms’ value. Thus, the central focus of corporate
governance today is how to preserve and protect the boundaries of the firm. The
big challenge is how can the firm obtain power over its human capital when it
cannot own it.1
What accounts for these changes in the world economy on the one hand and
in the nature of the corporation on the other? Why has human capital become
so important recently? There are two traditional explanations for the increased
importance of human capital in the literature: skill-biased technical change and
trade integration with low wage countries. Computerization and related technolo-
gies have caused firms to switch towards production techniques that are biased in
favor of skilled workers (Lawrence and Slaughter 1993). The increase in import
competition from low wage countries has shifted resources towards industries that
use skilled labor relatively intensive (Leamer 1993). We offer a novel explanation
for the increased importance of human capital based on changes in the organiza-
tion of the firm. Human capital has now more options where to go and it can
leave the firm. The improved opportunities for human capital outside the firm
happens at the same time as talent becomes the new source of value to the firm.
As a result, the organization of the corporation responds to this outside changes
by providing incentives for talent to prevent it from leaving the firm.2
1For an argument along this line see Rajan and Zingales (2000).
2Peter Drucker, a well known author of managerial books, argues in his article ”The Future of
the Company” in the The Economist December 2001 that giving more freedom to what he calls
today’s prized ”knowledge workers” is essential. He cites McKinsey, a consultancy, as argueing
that the key battle of this century is the war for talent.
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In this paper we combine the trade explanation for the increased importance
of human capital with an explanation based on the theory of the firm to examine
how competition for talent can affect the firm’s organization on the one hand and
how the firm’s mode of organization feeds back to the market for talent on the
other. For this purpose we introduce the theory of the firm into international trade
theory. More specifically, we combine a variant of the Aghion and Tirole (1997)
(AT) model of the firm with the Helpman and Krugman (1985) (HK) theory of
international trade to explain the emergence of the talent firm. The AT- theory
of the firm describes the power struggle inside a single firm but neglects the
market environment in which the firm operates, in particular competition with
other firms for talent. The HK-theory of international trade describes the market
environment in which the firm operates, but the firm remains a black box. The
integration of the two models will allow us to examine the interaction between
trade integration on the one hand and changes in corporate organization on the
other. We show that trade integration leads to a ’war for talent’ which induces
firms to change their organization empowering human capital. The resulting shift
in the organizational mix in the economy towards skill intensive firms, in turn,
raises the relative demand for human capital in industrialized countries. This
increase in the demand for skills is distinct and goes beyond the well known
relative increase for skilled workers due to a shift in the output mix towards more
skill intensive sectors that typically comes with trade integration with low wage
countries.
In a previous paper (Marin and Verdier MV 2002) we introduce the AT-firm
into the Dixit and Stiglitz model of monopolisitc competition to examine the
interaction between market competition on the one hand and the allocation of
power inside the corporation on the other. We find that goods market competi-
tion increases the stakes of the firm which makes delegation of power inside the
firm more costly. We also show that identical countries may have different corpo-
rate cultures depending on the mode of organization other firms choose. In MV
(2002) international trade leads to organizational convergence across countries.
The organizational equilibrium to which the world economy converges remains,
however, undetermined. In the present paper we allow countries to differ in fac-
tor endowments which enables us to predict to which organizational equilibrium
the integrated world economy will converge. The present paper is also related to
Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Antras (2003) who introduce the Hart and
Moore-firm into international trade. Their papers focus on the boundary of the
firm rather than on the firm as an internal organization as our paper does. Fi-
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nally, Rajan and Zingales (2001) develop a model of firm organization in which
the numbers of hierarchical layers in the corporation act as a wall of protection
against the threat of talent leaving and stealing the firm’s assets. However, they
focus on a single firm and ingnore interactions from goods and factor markets.
The paper is organized in the following sections. In section 2 we develop a two
sector general equilibrium model of a closed economy in which firms endogenously
choose the mode of organization. The model generates an organizational mix of
heterogenous firms which differ with respect to their power allocation inside the
corporation. In section 3 we examine how factor markets interact with firms’
optimal choice of organization. We show that the mode of firm organization mat-
ters for incentives inside the firm at intermediate start up costs of a firm only.
Furthermore, we show in this section how the scarcity of human capital in the
economy leads to a ’war for talent’ which, in turn, determines the mode of organi-
zation firms choose. We also present in this section what we call the Rybczynski
Theorem of Firm Organization’ with a novel feature of the old theorem that arises
when firms’ mode of organization is endogenous. Section 4 then examines how
international trade is affecting corporate organization in two dissimilar countries.
We show that international trade may lead to the emergence of the ’talent firm’
and to convergence in corporate cultures across countries. Finally, we explore in
this section how corporate organization determines the pattern of trade. Section
5 concludes.
2. A Model with Endogenous Firm Organizations
Consider an economy which produces the two goods X and Y with the two factors
of production labor L and human capital H. Good X is assumed to be more skill
intensive than good Y . Consumers preferences over the two goods X and Y are
U(X,Y ) = XaY 1−a with X =
·Z n
0
x(i)γdi
¸
1
γ and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 (2.1)
where x(i) is consumption of variety i of good X with γ as the degree of
product differentiation between different varieties of X. Sector Y consists of ho-
mogenous goods produced under perfect competition with a constant returns to
scale technology given by the unit production costs cY (w, q) where w and q are
the wage rates for unskilled and skilled labor, respectively. Sector X consists of n
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horizontally differentiated goods produced under monopolistic competition of the
Dixit and Stiglitz type.
2.1. ’Formal’ and ’Real’ Power in the Firm
In the X-sector there are n firms with a simple hierarchy consisting of a firm
(the principal P) and a skilled division manager (the agent A). In each firm the
CEO/owner hires a skilled manager to start a firm and employs unskilled workers
to produce. There are ex ante m alternative ways to run the firm which differ
in terms of production costs. We assume that among these projects only two
are worth doing from the perspective of both parties. One project has marginal
cost of production cB in terms of unskilled labor and is the ”best project” for the
CEO/owner in the sense that it yields the highest possible profit B among the
m alternatives. The other project has marginal costs of production cb in terms
of unskilled labor and is the ”best project” for the agent yielding the highest
possible non pecuniary benefit b for the agent. To make things interesting, we
assume that the firm produces with lower costs when the principal’s best project
is implemented cB < cb = ϕcB with ϕ > 1 so that there is a potential conflict of
interest between the firm and her agent. The idea here is that when the agent’s
best project is implemented he may not choose the cost minimizing project but
rather one with high perks for him.
Both parties may acquire information on possible ways to run the firm. How-
ever, we assume that the CEO has managerial overload. By spending some un-
skilled labor resource L, the principal learns the payoffs of all projects with prob-
ability E = Min
³
1, L
1
2
´
and remains uninformed with probability 1− E.3 This
generates convex costs of information collection gP (E) = wE2. Thus, the more
information the CEO collects, the higher is the marginal costs of further informa-
tion. Similarly, by exerting some effort gA(e) = ke with e ∈ [0, e], and k < b the
agent learns the payoff of all projects with probability e and remains uninformed
with probability 1− e. We suppose that the principal is risk neutral and that the
agent is infinitely risk averse with respect to income. Therefore, the agent is not
responsive to monetary incentives and receives a fixed wage q equal to his oppor-
3The idea here is that the principal/owner of the firm becomes an owner of the firm not
because of her skills but rather because of luck to happen to be born in a family with wealth.
An alternative interpretation of the low skill assumption is that the principal uses a low skilled
monitoring technology to gather information.
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tunity costs. All his incentives to gather information on projects will be directly
related to the private non pecuniary benefit b he gets from his ”best” project.
We denote αB with (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) as the principal/owner’s expected benefit
when the agent’s preferred project is implemented and βb with (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) as the
agent’s expected benefit when the principal’s preferred project is implemented.
α and β are congruence parameters capturing the degree of conflict between the
principal and the agent. The lower α or β, the more is each party’s respective
benefit reduced when the other party’s project is implemented. B and b are
supposed to be known ex ante though the parties do not know ex ante which
project yields such payoff. We assume also that, among the m projects, there
are some with very high negative payoffs to both parties, implying that choosing
randomly a project without being informed is not profitable to both agents who
instead prefer to do nothing (project 0). This aspect, together with the fact
that each uninformed party prefers to rubber-stamp the other informed’s party
suggestion to do nothing, implies that private information about payoffs gives
decision control to the informed party. In this case, the informed party has ”real
power” rather than ”formal power” in the firm. 4
In the X-sector, firms can choose between three types of organizations, a P-
organization in which the CEO/owner has formal power, an A-organization in
which the CEO/owner delegates formal power to the skilled division manager,
and an O-organization in which the CEO/owner has formal power without an
internal hierarchy (in which the agent exerts minimum effort). 5
The CEO/owner’s and the agent’s expected relevant payoffs under the P-
organization when the principal has formal power in the firm are
uP = EB + (1−E)eαB − wE2
uA = Eβb+ (1−E)eb− ke
With probability E, the CEO/owner becomes fully informed about her payoffs
and picks her preferred project with monetary payoff B, while the agent receives
4As emphasized by Aghion and Tirole (1997), there are two sources of power in the firm,
because it is allocated to the manager ”formal power”, or because the manager is better informed,
”real power”.
5The single managed O-firm corresponds to the Dixit and Stiglitz firm.
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only the expected private benefit βb.With probability 1−E, the principal remains
uninformed about payoffs. The agent may then learn the payoff with probability
e and suggest his best project to the principal (who accepts it). The principal
receives a monetary payoff αB while the agent gets his best private benefit b. Or
the agent may remain also uninformed in which case, no project is undertaken.
wE2 and ke are the costs of information collection of the principal and the agent,
respectively.
The first order conditions of the two parties with respect to efforts E and e
are
Principal: B(1− eα) = 2wE
Agent:
e = e if k ≤ b(1−E)
= 0 if k > b(1− E)
The conditions highlight the trade off between the principal’s control and the
agent’s initiative. The principal supervises more the higher her stake in the project
(the larger B), the larger the conflict of interest between the principal and her
agent (the lower α) and the lower the agent’s effort e. The agent, in turn, has
more initiative the higher her stake (the larger b) and the lower the principal’s
interference (the lower E). Thus, hierarchical control comes with the cost of
loosing the agent’s initiative.
Consider now the A-organization. In the A-firm the principal delegates formal
decision control to the agent. Now, the principal is prevented from overruling
the agent’s decision when both have acquired information. The advantage of
delegating formal power to the agent is that the agent has more initiative to
become informed. However, the principal looses now formal as well as real power
in the firm, since she has less incentives to become informed.
2.2. The Choice of Firm Organization
We now ask how the principal’s control efforts and the agent’s initiative inside
the firm respond to exogenous changes in the firm’s real payoff B/w under the
P-organization and under the A-organization, respectively. In Marin and Verdier
(2002) we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium in effort levels E∗, e∗ under
each mode of organization to examine how effort incentives respond when real
profits gradually increase from low levels B/w < eBP (α) , to intermediate levels
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eBP (α) < B/w < B(α) , to large levels B(α) ≤ B/w. A sketch of the analysis is
presented in the appendix. We summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Assume that
2(1− k/b)
1− eα <
4α
2− e <
2(1− k/b)
β(1− e)
and let eBP (α) = 2(1− k/b)
1− eα
B(α) =
4α
2− e
For B/w < eBP (α), the P-organization dominates the A-organization with e∗P = e
and E∗P =
B
w
(1−αe)
2
. For eBP (α) < B/w < B(α), the A-organization is preferred to
the P-organization with e∗A = e and E
∗
A =
B
w
(1−e)
2
. Finally, for B(α) ≤ B/w, the
P-organization again dominates the A-organization with e∗P = 0 and E
∗
P =
B
2w
.
eBP (α) and eBA are the threshold levels of profits at which the agent’s initiative
is killed under the P-organization and under the A-organization, respectively.
Recall that as profits increase the stakes of the principal rises and she controls
more potentially destroying the agent’s initiative. B(α) gives the threshold level
of profits at which the CEO/owner is indifferent between loosing control in the
firm while keeping the agent’s initiative as in the A-organization and keeping
control in the firm but loosing the agent’s initiative as in the O-organization.
Intuitively, the mode of organization matters for incentives inside the firm
at intermediate levels of profits only. At low and high profit levels, there is no
trade-off between control and initiative as is the case in a single AT-firm when
the market environment is ignored. At low real profit levels B/w, the principal
monitors and intervenes little because her stakes are small and she cares little.
Therefore, the principal chooses the P-organization as it gives sufficient initiative
to her agent. At high profit levels, the principal’s stakes are so large that she
intervenes even under the A-organization leading to minimum effort by the agent
also in the A-organization when the principal delegates formal control to the
agent. Therefore, she might as well keep control by choosing the P-organization.
At intermediate levels of profits there is a trade-off between control and initiative
and the principal delegates formal power to her agent to keep his initiative and
the A-firm emerges as the optimal mode of organization.
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2.3. Product Markets
In this section we endogenize the firm’s profits B by product market competition
of the Dixit and Stiglitz type. Given preferences as expressed in (2.1), demand
for goods X and Y can be written as
Y D =
a
pY
R and x(i) =
(1− a)RR n
0 p(j)
− γ
1−γ
p(i)−
1
1−γ = Ap(i)−
1
1−γ (2.2)
with pY the price of good Y , p(i) the price of variety i of good X , R is total
income, and A is a convenient constant reflecting general equilibrium effects.
Perfect competition in sector Y provides the standard price equals marginal
cost relationship
pY = cY (w, q)
For product varieties in sector X with marginal cost of production w.c(i)
monopolistic profit maximization results in the standard mark-up relationship
p(i) =
w.c(i)
γ
(2.3)
with firm’s profits as
π(i) = (1− γ)γ
γ
1−γA [w.c(i)]−
γ
1−γ
We can express the firm’s/principal’s profits as before in the partial equilibrium
setting by
α = ϕ−
γ
1−γ and B = (1− γ)γ
γ
1−γA [w.cB]
− γ
1−γ (2.4)
The congruence parameter α is now related to the two parameters ϕ and γ.
ϕ = cb/cB gives the cost differential of power in the firm. It measures by how
much production costs of the firm wc(i) go up when the agent has control in the
firm rather than the principal, ϕ > 1. The larger ϕ the less cost efficient is the
firm under the A-organization compared to the P-organization and thus the more
it matters for profits who runs the firm.
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2.4. Factor Markets
We turn now to factor markets. In the perfect competitive Y sector the demand
for unskilled and skilled labor, respectively are given by aLY Y and a
H
Y Y . a
L
Y and
aHY are the unit input requirements in sector Y and are given by shepard’s lemma
aLY (w, q) =
∂cY (w, q)
∂w
and aHY (w, q) =
∂cY (w, q)
∂q
Denote θL(w, q) and θH(w, q) as the unskilled and skilled labor share cost in
the Y sector
θL(w, q) =
w aLY (w, q)
pY
and θH(w, q) = 1− θL(w, q) =
q aHY (w, q)
pY
Firms in the X sector hire a skilled manager to find and supervise a produc-
tion project and employ unskilled workers to produce. The firm’s output in the
monopolistic competitive X sector is given by
x(i) = γ
1
1−γA [w c(i)]−
1
1−γ (2.5)
From this, we may derive the total demand for unskilled labor in the X sec-
tor for each organizational equilibrium (depending on whether firms will choose
the P-organization, A-organization, or the O-organization) using the law of large
numbers and the fact that the probability for a firm to run a production project
with unit costs of unskilled labor c(i) is also the fraction of firms having such a cost
structure. Note that the aggregate demand for unskilled labour in the X sector
depends on the organizational mix of real P-firms and real A-firms (as compared
to formal P-firms and formal A-firms), because the firm’s mode of organization
affects its production costs and with it its individual labour demand. Note further
that even under an organizational equilibrium with formal P-firms there will be
a share of real A-firms in the X sector, when the principal in these firms decides
not to get informed about projects in which case the agent has real power (a real
A-firm) even when the principal has formal power in the firm (a formal P-firm).
- Labor demand under a formal P-organization with agent’s effort
Consider first the aggregate labor demand for unskilled labor under the P-
organization. It can be written as
LDP = n [E
∗
P cBxB + (1− E∗P )e∗P cbxb] + n(E∗P )2 + aLY Y
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The demand for unskilled labor has three components, the labor demand from
the monopolistic X-sector given by n [..] ,the labor demand from the competitive
Y-sector given by aLY Y , and the labor demand from the principal’s unskilled
monitoring activity n(E∗P )
2. The first term in the first bracket is the demand
for unskilled labor from real P-firms for which the principal’s preferred project is
implemented. Their fraction is (by the law of large numbers) E∗P under the P-
organization with the firm’s individual labor demand cBxB. Similarly, the second
term in the first bracket is the demand for unskilled labor from real A-firms
for which the agent’s preferred project is implemented. Their fraction is (1 −
E∗P )e
∗
P under the P-organization with the firm’s individual labor demand cbxb.
In the second bracket of the RHS, the term E∗P
2 captures the unskilled labor
of direct monitoring by the principal. We assume here that the principal can
use a monitoring technology produced with unskilled labor to supervise projects.
Substituting xB, xb and cb gives
LDP = nAγ
1
1−γw
−1
1−γ [E∗P + (1− E∗P )αe∗P ] [cB]
− γ
1−γ + n(E∗P )
2 + aLY Y
which can be rewritten to
LDP = n
γ
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶
[E∗P + (1− E∗P )αe∗P ] + n(E∗P )2 + aLY Y (2.6)
Similarly, the aggregate demand for human capital under the P-organization is
given by
HDP = n+ a
H
Y Y (2.7)
The first term n reflects the fact that each monopolistic firm hires a skilled agent
to run the firm. The second term is the demand for skilled labor from sector Y .6
Using the goods market equilibrium for sector Y and (2.2) we get
Y =
a
pY
R =
a
1− a
R n
0 p(j)
− γ
1−γ
pY
A =
a
1− a
Ã
B
pY
!
n
1− γ [E
∗
P + (1− E∗P )αe∗P ]
6We assume here that skilled workers behave somewhat myopic when considering to which
of the two sectors to move. They compare the monetary wage in the X- and Y -sector and
ignore the non-pecuniary benefits they receive when employed as a manager in the X-sector.
We assume here that skilled workers learn about the non-pecuniary benefit as managers only ex-
post after being hired in the firm. This assumption simplifies the analysis considerably without
being central to our argument.
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Denote νP = E∗P + (1−E∗P )αe∗P as the ’organizational mix’ of firms in the X
sector. Substituting and regrouping terms we then have
LDP = n
νP
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶ ·
γ +
a
1− aθL(w, q)
¸
+ n(E∗P )
2
HDP = n+ n
νP
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶
a
1− aθH(w, q)
w
q
These labor demand functions hold for regions of real profit levels B/w for
which the P-organization is an equilibrium. Using Proposition 1 from the previous
section (2.6) and (2.7) hold for
B/w < B˜P (α) and E∗P =
(1− eα)
2
B
w
, e∗P = e (2.8)
Substituting (2.8) in (2.6), finally results in the following aggregate demand
for labor and human capital
LDP = n
νP
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶ ·
γ +
a
1− aθL(w, q)
¸
+ n
µ
B
w
¶2 (1− eα)2
4
(2.9)
HDP = n+ n
νP
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶
a
1− aθH(w, q)
w
q
with the ’organizational mix’
νP =
(1− eα)2
2
µ
B
w
¶
+ eα (2.10)
As can be seen aggregate factor demand depends on the number of firms in
the X-sector n, on the organizational mix of real P-firms and real A-firms in the
X-sector νP , and on real profits B/w determining the size of the Y-sector and the
principal’s monitoring activity inside firms in the X-sector.
- Labor demand under a formal A-organization
Consider now the aggregate demand for unskilled and skilled labor under the
A-organization in which the principal delegates formal power to her skilled agent.
As before, it can be written as
LDA = n [e
∗
Acbxb + (1− e∗A)E∗AcBxB] + n(E∗A)2 + aLY Y (2.11)
HDA = n+ a
H
Y Y
14
The first term in the first bracket is the demand for unskilled labor from firms
in which the agent has control. Their fraction is e∗A with the firm’s individual labor
demand cbxb. The second term in the first bracket is the demand for unskilled labor
from firms in which the principal has real power in the firm under the formal
A-organization. Their fraction is (1 − e∗A)E∗A with the firm’s individual labor
demand cBxB. The term E∗A
2 is the unskilled labor cost of direct monitoring by
the principal and aLY Y is again the demand for unskilled labor from sector Y .
We can rewrite these as
LDA = n
νA
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶ ·
γ +
a
1− aθL(w, q)
¸
+ n(E∗A)
2
HDA = n+ n
νA
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶
a
1− aθH(w, q)
w
q
with νA = e∗Aα + (1 − e∗A)E∗A, as the ” organizational mix” in an A-equilibrium.
These labor demand functions hold for regions of profits B/w for which the A-
organization is an equilibrium. Using again Proposition 1, this holds when
eBP (α) < B/w < B(α) and E∗A = B(1− e)2w , e∗A = e (2.12)
Substituting (2.12) in (2.11) gives the following aggregate demand for labour
and human capital
LDA = n
νA
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶ ·
γ +
a
1− aθL(w, q)
¸
+ n
µ
B
w
¶2 (1− e)2
4
(2.13)
HDA = n+ n
νA
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶
a
1− aθH(w, q)
w
q
with
νA =
(1− e)2
2
µ
B
w
¶
+ eα (2.14)
- Labor demand under an O-organization with no agent’s effort
Finally, we consider the aggregate unskilled and skilled labor demand under
the O-organization. Recall that in the O-organization the CEO/principal runs
the firm herself without the agent’s cooperation. As before, it can be written as
LD0 = n [E
∗
0cBxB] + n
³
1 + (E∗0)
2
´
+ aLY Y (2.15)
HD0 = n+ a
H
Y Y
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with E∗0 as the fraction of firms in which the agent does not do anything useful.
(1 + (E∗0)
2) captures the unskilled labor costs of monitoring of the principal, given
that she is the only one that collects information. Again, this can be rewritten to
LD0 = n
ν0
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶ ·
γ +
a
1− aθL(w, q)
¸
+ n(E∗0)
2
HD0 = n+ n
ν0
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶
a
1− aθH(w, q)
w
q
with ν0 = E∗0 as the ”organizational mix” in the O-regime. These labor demand
functions hold for regions of profits for which the O-organization emerges as an
equilibrium given by
B/w > B(α) and E∗0 =
B
2w
, (2.16)
Again substituting (2.16) in (2.15) finally yields the following aggregate de-
mand for labor and human capital
LD0 = n
ν0
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶ ·
γ +
a
1− aθL(w, q)
¸
+ n
1
4
µ
B
w
¶2
(2.17)
HD0 = n+ n
ν0
1− γ
µ
B
w
¶
a
1− aθH(w, q)
w
q
with
ν0 = E
∗
0 =
B
2w
(2.18)
The market clearing conditions for unskilled and skilled labor can then be
generally stated as
LDi = L for i ∈ {P,A, 0}
HDi = H for i ∈ {P,A, 0}
2.5. Free Entry
Firms enter the X-sector until profits are driven down to cover the fixed start up
costs of a firm. The free entry conditions for the three possible organizational
equilibria are
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P-organization with e∗P = e
u∗P = w(E
∗
P )
2 + eαB − q = 0
The first two terms are the equilibrium expected current profits of the firm. q is
the start-up cost of a firm. To start a firm the principal has to hire a skilled agent
as a manager. After substituting the condition can be restated as
(1− eα)2
4
(
B
w
)2 + eα(
B
w
) =
q
w
(2.19)
A-organization with e∗A = e
u∗A = w(E
∗
A)
2 + eαB − q = 0
which can be rewritten to
(1− e)2
4
(
B
w
)2 + eα(
B
w
) =
q
w
(2.20)
O-organization with e∗0 = 0
u∗0 = w(E
∗
0)
2 − q = 0
which can be rewritten to
1
4
(
B
w
)2 =
q
w
(2.21)
3. Corporate Organization and the Scarcity of Talent
We are now in a position to describe the equilibrium under autarky. The analysis
proceeds in three stages. First, we analyze the factor market clearing free entry
equilibria treating firms’ organizational choice as given. Then we derive how the
factor endownment of a country affects its firms’ mode of organization. Finally,
we determine how international trade is affecting these organizational equilibria.
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3.1. Equilibrium in a Closed Economy
We start now to describe the equilibrium under autarky contingent on the orga-
nizational equilibrium which will emerge inside the firm.
- Equilibrium with P-organization and e∗P = e
The endogenous variables determining the equilibrium in the P-regime are
the stakes of the firm B/w, the ”organizational mix” of firms in the X-sector
νP , the number of monopolistic firms n, and the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled labor q/w. Using the two factor market clearing conditions (2.9), the
condition determining the organizational mix (2.10), and the free entry condition
(2.19) and accounting for the fact that because of the homogeneity property of the
cost functions, the unskilled and skilled labor cost shares θL(w, q) = 1− θH(w, q)
depend on the relative wage q/w only, we get
L
H
=
νP
1−γ
³
B
w
´ h
γ + a
1−aθL(q/w)
i
+
³
B
w
´2 (1−eα)2
4
νP
1−γ
³
B
w
´
a
1−a
[1−θL(q/w)]
q/w
+ 1
which can be simplified to
L
H
= ΘP (
B
w
)
with ΘP (Bw ) as the required real profit level which guarantees factor market clear-
ing. ΘP will be upward sloping under the following assumptions.
Assumption A.1 : γ +
a
1− a(2θL − 1) > 0
Good Y is sufficient unskilled labor intensive, ie θL is large enough.
Assumption A.2: θL is weakly increasing in q/w
Assumption A.2 says that the cost share of unskilled labor for good Y θL is
increasing in q/w; This will be the case true when the elasticity of substitution
σY between skilled and unskilled labor for good Y is larger than 1.7.
7There is quite a large variation of estimates of this ”macro” elasticity in the empirical
literature. So far, the consensus seems to be that the mean estimate of this elasticity is larger
than 1 (Freeman 1986).
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We show in the Appendix that under assumptions A.1 and A.2, ΘP is increas-
ing in B/w. Note also that limB/w→∞ΘP (B/w) = +∞ and ΘP (0) = 0
- Equilibrium with A-organization and e∗P = e
Similarly, with the same procedure as before using the two factor market
clearing conditions (2.13), the condition for the organizational mix (2.14), and
the free entry condition (2.20), we get the free entry organizational A-equilibrium
as
L
H
=
νa
1−γ
³
B
w
´ h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
+
³
B
w
´2 (1−e)2
4
νA
1−γ
³
B
w
´
a
1−a
[1−θL]
q/w
+ 1
which simplifies to
L
H
= ΘA(
B
w
)
ΘA is again upward sloping in B/w under assumptions A.1 and A.2. Further-
more, limB/w→∞ΘA(B/w) = +∞ and ΘA(0) = 0. Also, because of νA < νP ,
ΘA(Bw ) < ΘP (
B
w
) for all values of B/w > 0.
- Equilibrium with O-organization and e∗0 = 0
Analogously, the free entry organizational O-equilibrium is given by
L
H
=
ν0
1−γ
³
B
w
´ h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
+
³
B
w
´2
1
4
ν0
1−γ
³
B
w
´
a
1−a
[1−θL]
q/w
+ 1
which can be restated as
L
H
= Θ0(
B
w
)
with the same properties as before for Θ0.
Finally, for small values of B/w , the Θ schedules can be ranked as Θ0(B/w) <
ΘA(B/w) < ΘP (B/w). For large values of B/w, it holds that Θ0(B/w) >
ΘA(B/w). Hence, there is a least one value of B/w such that the two curves
Θ0(B/w) and ΘA(B/w) cross each other. For expositional ease, we will assume
that they only cross once. A typical example that satisfies such a case is when
θL = 1 and the competitive sector Y uses unskilled labor only.
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3.2. The Human Capital Constraint
Next, we want to examine how a country’s relative factor endownment L
H
de-
termines the mode of organization its firms choose. This is done in Figure 1.
The three schedules P, A and O on the right side of Figure 1 correspond to
ΘP (B/w) = L/H, ΘA(B/w) = L/H and Θ0(B/w) = L/H that we have just de-
rived. They give the real operating profits in terms of unskilled labor consistent
with factor market clearing under a P-, A-, and O-organizational equilibrium, re-
spectively. The three schedules are upward sloping in L
H
, because as the country
becomes more unskilled labor rich the relative wage w/q falls and real profits B/w
have to increase to restore factor market equilibrium. An increase in real profits
increases the demand for unskilled labor for two reasons. First, production in the
X- and Y-sector expands, and this expansion is biased towards the less skill inten-
sive Y-sector. This is a standard Rybczynski effect on the output mix. Second,
the firm controls more as her stakes rise with an increase in profits. Recall, that
the principal’s monitoring activity is assumed to be low skill intensive. Via this
channel the factor endownment of a country has a direct influence on the behavior
inside the firm.
The A-schedule lies above the P-schedule, since A-firms in which the skilled
agent runs the firm, are more skill intensive organizations than P-firms. Thus, it
requires larger real profits to clear factor markets in an A-equilibrium compared
to a P-equilibrium. The relative demand for unskilled labor is lower in an A-
equilibrium, because in A-firms the principal monitors less and firms’ ouput is
lower compared to P-firms. Thus, for a given relaxation in the resource constraint
real profits have to increase by more in the A-equilibrium compared to the P-
equilibrium to still satisfy the factor market clearing condition.
The O-curve is above the A-curve for low levels of L
H
and below the A-curve for
high levels of L
H
. O-firms and A-firms cannot be ranked unambigiously in terms
of their factor intensity, because of two conflicting effects. At low levels of L
H
, the
stakes of the firm are low and thus the principal exerts little control in the O-
firm. This in turn generates few opportunities for profitable production projects
compared to A-firms. As production is using unskilled labor, the demand for un-
skilled labor is then smaller in the O-equilibrium compared to the A-equilibrium.
Thus, a relatively larger increase in real profits is required to absorb the relative
excess supply of unskilled labor in the O-equilibrium. At large levels of L
H
, the
stakes of the firm are large and the relative demand for unskilled labor is larger
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in the O-equilibrium than in the A-equilibrium both because output per firm and
information collection by the principal are larger in O-firms compared to A-firms.
Therefore, real profits need to increase by less in the O-equilibrium compared to
the A-equilibrium to clear the factor market.
q
UuA
UuO
UuP
Figure 1: Factor Endowment and Organizational Equilibrium
The left side diagram of Figure 1 gives the free entry conditions u∗P , u
∗
A
, and u∗0 for P-, A-, and O-firms, respectively from (2.19), (2.20), and (2.21)
which relate the firms’ real operating profits B/w to their fixed costs of market
entry. u∗P , u
∗
A, and u
∗
0 may be called the ”war for talent” curves. Starting a firm
involves hiring a skilled agent for information collection who is paid a wage q.
Thus, the firm’s start up costs in terms unskilled labor are given by the wage gap
q/w. The wage gap q/w increases with B/w, because when real operating profits
increase new firms want to enter the market. Firms can enter and run a firm
only by hiring a skilled agent. Thus, market entry is constraint by the amount
of available human capital H in the country. Firms compete for the scarce talent
of agents available in the economy to start new firms. As the resource constraint
for human capital binds, market entry cannot happen and the relative wage for
talent q/w increases to meet the demand for skilled agents.
Returning to the right side diagram of Figure 1 we turn now to the firms’
optimal choice of organization which from Proposition 1 is determined by the two
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horizontal lines eBP and B. The eBP -line captures the cost of having control in the
firm in terms of the loss of the agent’s initiative. eBP gives the threshold level
of profits at which the agent’s initiative is killed under the P-organization. The
B-line captures the gain of having control in the firm in terms of the firm’s profits.
B gives the threshold level of profits at which the principal is indifferent between
the O-firm in which she runs the firm without the agent’s cooperation and the
A-firm in which the principal delegates power to her agent. From Proposition 1 we
know that for profit levels below the eBP -line the benefit of control outweights its
costs and firms choose the P-organization. In fact, at these levels of profits there
are no costs of control, since the agent’s initiative can be kept alive under the
P-organization. For profit levels B/w inbetween the eBP - and B-lines, the cost of
control outweights the benefit and the firms go for the A-organization. Delegating
control allows to maintain the agent’s initiative, while at the same time delegation
of power does not cost too much in terms of profits. For profit levels above the
B-line, the benefit of control again outweights its costs and firms choose the O-
organization. Real profits are so large that the principal kills the initiative of the
agent even under the A-organization, while delegating power incurs large losses
in profits.
Clearly, an organizational equilibrium has to be both consistent with factor
market clearing and consistent with the firm’s optimal choice of organization.
Hence, building on Proposition 1, we derive the pattern of symmetric organiza-
tional equilibria in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Let the following factor endowments (L/H)P , (L/H)A, (L/H)M ,
and (L/H)O be given by (L/H)P = ΘP ( eBP (α)), (L/H)A = ΘA( eBP (α)), (L/H)M =
ΘM(B(α)) and (L/H)O = Θ0(B(α)).Then,for L/H < (L/H)A, all firms adopt a
P -organization;
for L/H ∈ [(L/H)A, (L/H)P ], there are multiple equilibria, firms either adopt
a P -organization or an A-organization;
for L/H ∈ [(L/H)P , (L/H)M ], all firms adopt an A-organization;
for L/H ≥ (L/H)O, all firms adopt an O-organization.
These organizational equilibria are depicted in bold in Figure 1. The right
diagram of Figure 1 illustrates how factor market clearing interacts with the
firm’s optimal choice of organization. A factor market clearing equilibrium P-
organization is along the bold P-curve below the eBP -line in the region of L/H
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in [0, (L/H)P ]. Below the eBP -line firms choose the P-organization and along the
P-curve operating real profits are such that firms have an incentive to enter as
P-firms. Moreoever, they are able to find a talented agent to start a firm, since
the market for talent is in equilibrium along the P-curve. Similarly, a factor
market clearing A-equilibrium is along the bold A-curve in the region of L/H
in [(L/H)A, (L/H)M ] in between the two profit lines eBP and B. In beetween
the two latter lines firms choose the A-organization and along the A-curve firms
enter as A-firms and find enough talent to hire. Finally, a factor market clearing
equilibrium with O-organizations is along the bold O-curve above the B-line in the
region of L/H in [(L/H)0,∞]. Above the B-line firms choose the O-organization
and along the O-curve firms enter with O-organizations and find the personnel to
do so.
The bold line in the right diagram of Figure 1 describes the nature of the
factor market clearing organizational equilibria as a function of a country’s factor
endownment. The left diagram of Figure 1 gives the free entry conditions and
the firm’s start up costs which correspond to these equilibria. With an increase
in L/H, the equilibrium firm organization moves from the P-firm in which power
is concentrated at the top of the corporate hierarchy, to the A-firm in which
the talented manager runs the firm, and finally to the single managed O-firm
in which the firm is run without her manager’s cooperation.8 As the country
becomes more unskilled labor rich, the fixed costs of market entry increase and
thus firms require larger operating real profits to enter the market. With the
increase in the relative wage for skilled labor q/w, it becomes more expensive to
start a firm. This means that the stakes of the firm rise with an increase in
L/H. We move up along one of the three u-curves in the left diagram contingent
on which organizational equilibrium emerges. As the stakes rise the principal’s
incentive to take control in the firm increases.9
Initially, at a low ratio of L/H , the start up costs of a firm are not too large.
Therefore, the principal monitors only little and does not kill the initiative of
8A move from the P-organization to the A-organization in which the skilled manager runs
the firm can be thought of as the firm outsourcing the division to her manager.
9The monotone increasing function between the relative factor endownment of a country
L/H and the free entry profit level B∗/w shows how the AT model of the firm speaks to the HK
theory of international trade. With an increase in the ratio L/H the required profits to enter the
market and thus the free entry stakes of the firm rise. Via this channel the factor endownment
of a country affects the behavior inside the firm.
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the agent under the P-organization. Hence, firms choose the latter. We move
up along the bold uP -curve in the left side diagram and the bold P-curve in
the right side diagram. However, when the ratio of L/H keeps increasing and
takes intermediate levels in the region of [(L/H)A, (L/H)M ], the relative wage
for manager talent and thus the firm’s required stakes to enter the market are
high enough to kill the initiative of the agent under the P-organization. There
is a trade-off between control and initiative for the firm. The principal delegates
power to the skilled agent to prevent the loss of his enthusiasm and the A-
organization emerges as a free entry factor market clearing equilibrium. We move
up along the bold uA-curve in the left side diagram and the bold A-curve in the
right side diagram. The empowernment of talent stops to work as an incentive
devise for initiative, however, when the ratio of L/H keeps increasing further in
the region of [(L/H)0,∞]. The start-up costs and stakes of the firm are now so
large that the firm wants control no matter what and the single managed O-firm
without the agent’s initiative emerges as the equilibrium organization. We move
up along the bold u0-curve in the left side diagram and the bold O-curve in the
right side diagram.
Note that in the range of factor endowments of [(L/H)A, (L/H)P ] the model
produces multiple organizational equilibria. One equilibrium mode of organiza-
tion is the P-firm and another equilibrium is the A-organization. At this region of
factor endowments the attractiveness between these two modes of organizations
depends on the organizational decision taken by other firms in the market. Each
firm individually would choose the A-organization at this range of L/H, since in
between the two horizontal lines eBP and B the A-organization is optimal. How-
ever, when the firm anticipates that all other firms will choose the P-organization,
then she also anticipates that the equilibrium relative wage for skilled labor q/w
will be lower as well. Thus, an individual A-firm with larger marginal costs of
production cb > cB compared to P-firms will then have to pay a larger wage to its
unskilled workers w. As a result, the firm anticipates that with production costs
w.cb it will not be profitable to enter with an A-organization. Thus, the firm’s
best choice will be to choose a P-organization as well. Similarly, when the firm
anticipates that all other firms will choose the A-organization, then she expects a
larger equilibrium relative wage for skilled labor and thus the firm can profitably
enter with an A-organization as well. Note further, that the multiplicity of equi-
libria disappears for low and large values of L/H because in each of these cases
the start up costs and thus the entry stakes of the firm are either so low or so
large that all firms will find it profitable to either choose the P-organization at
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levels of L/H below (L/H)A or to opt for the A-organization at levels of L/H
above (L/H)P whatever the other firms’ organizational modes. There is no need
to coordinate actions among firms in these cases.
Finally, note that for L/H in the region of ](L/H)M , (L/H)O[ mixed equi-
libria with A-organizations and O-organizations exist. If a pure equilibrium with
A-organizations existed in this range, it had to be consistent both with factor
market clearing (ie. B/w on the A-curve with ΘA(B/w) = L/H) and with
the optimal choice of firm organization ( ie. B/w below B(α)). As can be
seen from Figure 1, this is clearly impossible as ΘA(.) is increasing in B/w and
ΘA(B/w) = L/H > (L/H)M = ΘA(B(α)). Similary, if a pure equilibrium with
O-organizations existed, it had to be consistent both with factor market clearing
(ie.B/w on the O-curve with ΘO(B/w) = L/H) and with the optimal firm or-
ganization ( ie. B/w above B(α)). Again, this is clearly impossible as ΘO(.) is
increasing in B/w and ΘO(B/w) = L/H < (L/H)O = ΘO(B(α)). Hence, for fac-
tor endowments in this region a mixed equilibrium with A- and O-organizations
exist. We explore these mixed organizational equilibria in more detail in the next
section.
3.3. Rybczynski and Mixed Organizational Equilibria
By definition, in a mixed organizational equilibrium firms are indifferent between
different modes of organizations. We know from Proposition 1 that whenever it is
feasable (at sufficiently low real profit levels of B/w ≤ eBP ) the P -organization is
preferred over the other two organizations. Therefore, a real profit level at which
firms are indifferent between the P-organization and the A-organization does not
exists. Hence, the only candidate mixed equilibrium is between A-firms and O-
firms. Firms will be indifferent between these two modes of organizations when
they lead to the same operating profits given by B/w = B(α).
Denote then λ as the fraction of firms choosing an A-organization in such a
candidate mixed equilibrium. Using the law of large numbers aggregate factor
demand is then
LDM = λL
D
A + (1− λ)LD0
HDM = λH
D
A + (1− λ)HD0
with LDA and L
D
0 as given in (2.13) and H
D
A and H
D
0 as given in (2.17) and calcu-
lated for the indifference profit level B/w = B(α).
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The free entry condition for both A-firms and O-firms for the indifference profit
level B(α) is
(1− e)2
4
(B(α))2 + eα(B(α)) =
1
4
(B(α))2 =
q
w
(3.1)
which pins down uniquely the wage gap q/w in a mixed organizational equilib-
rium. B/w = B(α) fixes uniquely the organizational mix of firms under the two
organizations νA and ν0 given in (2.14) and (2.18). Finally, since θL(w, q) is a
function of the wage gap q/w only, it follows that the aggregate factor demands
LDA , H
D
A , L
D
0 , and H
D
0 from A-firm and O-firms, respectively in such a mixed or-
ganizational equilibrium are also constant. The factor market clearing conditions
can then be written as
L
H
= µΘA(B(α)) + (1− µ)Θ0(B(α))
= µ
µ
L
H
¶
M
+ (1− µ)
µ
L
H
¶
O
with
µ =
λHDA
λHDA + (1− λ)HD0
∈]0, 1[
The following proposition summarizes the previous discussion and describes
the nature of the mixed organizational equilibria.
Proposition 3.2. The Rybczynski Theorem of Firm Organization
i) For each L/H ∈](L/H)M , (L/H)O[, there exists a unique mixed equilibrium
with A-organizations and O-organizations with the following properties
ii) Factor prices are fixed and do not depend on factor endownments.
iii) The fraction of firms choosing an A-organization is given by
λ∗ =
µHD0
(1− µ)HDA + µHD0
with
µ = µ(
L
H
) =
³
L
H
´
O
− L
H³
L
H
´
O
−
³
L
H
´
M
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iv) For all L/H outside the interval ](L/H)M , (L/H)O[ a mixed organizational
equilibrium does not exists.
v) For each L/H ∈ ](L/H)M , (L/H)O[ , we have the Rybczynski Theorem of
Firm Organization
d(1− λ∗)
1− λ∗ >
d( L
H
)
L
H
> 0 >
dλ∗
λ∗
Proof in the Appendix
The intuition for Proposition 3 can again be illustrated with the help of Figure
1. The mixed equilibrium with A-organizations and O-organizations is in the
region [(L/H)M , (L/H)O] in which the ΘM -curve becomes horizontal at the profit
level B at which the A-organization and the O-organization both lead to the same
level of profits. As the relative supply of unskilled labor increases in this range,
factor prices q/w remain fixed. To understand why this is happening, we turn
to the positively sloped part of the A-curve at a profit level just below B. As
we move up along the A-curve in this range, production in the X-sector and
Y-sector expands with an increase in L/H. Output becomes less skill intensive
as the expansion is biased toward the unskilled intensive Y-sector. This is a
standard Rybczynski effect on the output mix. Relative demand for unskilled
labor increases as a result and factor prices q/w adjust along the uA-curve in the
left side diagram of Figure 1.
This sectoral reallocation along the A-curve takes place until we reach the
indifference profit level B. At this profit level a shift in the organizational mode
takes place with an increase in L/H. Firms change their organization from A to O.
This organizational change makes both production as well as monitoring activity
less skill intensive. As a result, relative demand for unskilled labor increases. We
move from a skill intensive organization in which the skilled agent runs the firm
to an unskilled labor intensive organization in which the principal runs the firm.
Moreoever, the organizational shift from A to O leads to an increase in output
per firm in the X-sector which uses unskilled labor. If all firms would switch
to the O-organization at once, there would be an excess demand for unskilled
labor. In order for factor markets to clear, a fraction of firms λ remains with
the skill intensive A-organization easing the demand for unskilled labor. The
relative resource constraint µ captures the relative excess demand for unskilled
labor when all firms switch to the O-organization which, in turn, determines
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the required fraction of firms staying with the A-organization to obtain factor
market equilibrium. Rather than factor prices, the fraction of firms with an A-
organization adjusts to guarantee factor market clearing. Thus, as we move along
the flat part of the ΘM -curve, factor prices remain fixed and the organizational
mix changes rather than the output mix as is the case along a movement on the
A-curve. The organizational mix of firms is biased toward the unskilled intensive
O-organization. This is a Rybczynski effect on the organizational mix rather than
on the output mix as is usual in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model in which the
firm organization is exogenous.
4. Trade and the Emergence of the Talent Firm
We can now proceed to analyze how international trade is affecting a country’s
corporate organization. Suppose two countries North N and South S which differ
in their factor endownments open trade with one another at zero transportation
cost. N is endowed with LN and HN and S with LS and HS . Suppose that
North is human capital rich and South is labor rich with LN /HN < LS /HS.
Denote L = LN + LS and H = HN +HS as the world factor endowments.
In order to understand how trade is affecting the equilibrium choice of corpo-
rate organization, we consider a trading equilibrium with factor price equalization.
Hence, the integrated world economy is equivalent to a single economy under au-
tarky with factor endowments L = LN +LS and H = HN +HS. We illustrate the
effect of trade with the help of Figure 2 which reproduces Figure 1 for trade in-
tegration with factor price equalization. Suppose the factor endowment of North
LN /HN happens to be below (L/H)A and that of the South LS /HS is above
(L/H)O. Thus, under autarky firms in N adopt a hierarchical P-organization in
which the CEO has power at the top of the corporate hierarchy, while firms in
S choose the single managed O-organization in which the CEO runs the corpo-
ration without her talented manager’s cooperation. The corresponding relative
wages for skilled labor q/w in the two countries are given by points N and S in
the left diagram of Figure 2. What happens now when these two economies start
to trade?
We know that the factor endowment of the integrated world economy (L/H)W
will be somewhere between that of country N and country S. From Prospositions
1 and 2 we also know that depending on which (L/H)W emerges in the world
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trading equilibrium, there are various organizational equilibria possible. One such
outcome is a factor endowment of the integrated world economy (L/H)W in the
interval [(L/H)P , (L/H)M ] in Figure 2 in which firms adopt an A-organization in
the world trading equilibrium. How is this coming about? In the human capital
rich North international trade leads to stronger specialization in the skill intensive
monitoring activity resulting in a resource reallocation toward the skill intensive
X-sector. As a result, the relative wage for unskilled labor falls and real operating
profits in terms of unskilled labor increase B/w. This, in turn, makes entry into
the X-sector more attractive. However, firms can enter and run a firm only by
hiring a skilled agent. Thus, market entry is constraint by the amount of available
talent in the country. Firms compete for the scarce talent of agents and bid up
the relative wage for talent. As the start up costs of a firm increase, firms require
larger real operating profits to enter the market. As the stakes of the firm rise,
the principal takes more control inside the corporation potentially destroying her
agent’s intiative. To maintain her engagement in the firm the principal delegates
formal power to the skilled agent resulting in an organizational change from the
P-firm to the A-firm.
q/w
U     uA
UuO
UuP
Figure 2: Trade Integration and Organizational Change
In the industrialized North international trade puts pressure on the demand
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for talent for three distinct reasons: skill-bias sectoral reallocation, the ’war for
talent’, and skill-bias organizational change. The first effect is the conventional
skill bias resource reallocation from the Y- to the X-sector which increases the
demand for skills for the usual reasons.10 In the ’war for talent’ effect new firms
enter the market and compete with incumbent firms for scarce manager talent
in order to start a firm. The organizational change effect from the P-firm to the
A-firm involves a shift from a low skill intensive organization to a skill intensive
organization. Each of these mechanisms lead to an increase in the relative demand
for skills resulting in a widening of the wage gap in the North from point N to
point W in the left diagram of Figure 2.
In the labor rich South trade leads to a resource reallocation toward the un-
skilled intensive Y-sector and to a decline in real operating profits in terms of
unskilled labor with some firms exiting from the X-sector lowering the start-up
cost of firms. As there is less at stake in firms in the South, the CEO/owner in
these firms cares less about control and more about gaining the talented agent’s
initiative. Hence, she delegates formal power to him resulting in a shift from the
O-firm to the A-firm. In the South, international trade eases the demand for skills
because of an unskilled bias resource reallocation and the exit of some firms from
the X-sector releasing manager talent. The increase in the relative demand for
skills due to the skill bias organizational change from the O-firm to the A-firm is
of second order. As a result, in the South the wage gap declines from point S to
point W in the left diagram of Figure 2.
4.1. Convergence in Corporate Cultures
We have just seen that the North as well as the South converge to an A-organizational
equilibrium in which the skilled manager has power in the corporation when both
regions each start with a different corporate organization of a P-firm and an O-
firm, respectively. How likely is it that organizational convergence will take place?
We answer this question by using the technique of the edgeworth box of world
factor endowments applied by Helpman and Krugman (1985). More specifically,
for a given size of world factor endowments L = LN + LS and H = HN + HS,
the parallelogram in Figure 3 represents the distributions of factor endowments
between the two economies which characterize a trade equilibrium with factor
10The resource reallocation effect is degenerated in our model because we assume for simplicity
that the X-sector uses no skilled labor in production, but only in monitoring.
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price equalization replicating the integrated world economy. We reverse now the
question we ask in Figure 2 by starting the analyses with the assumption that in
the integrated world economy an equilibrium with A-organizations has emerged.
We now ask what distributions of factor endowments between North and South
under autarky are consistent with this A-organizational equilibrium of the inte-
grated world economy?
The vector NY of the parallelogram is the employment level of factors L and
H in the Y -sector and the vector Y S is the employment level of the two factors
in the X-sector. Sector Y is less skill intensive than sector X. Because we start
with the assumption that in the integrated world economy an equilibrium with
A-organizations has emerged, the diagonal NS represents the factor endowment
ratios of the integrated world economy (L/H)W at which both regions choose the
A-organization represented by {A;A}. The light rays from the origin of North
N (L/H)A and (L/H)P are the threshold levels of factor endowment ratios
at which an organizational change occurs which correspond to those in Figure
2. Similarly, the light rays from the origin of South S (L/H)M and (L/H)O are
the threshold levels of factor endowment ratios at which an organizational shift
occurs which again correspond to those in Figure 2. By symmetry we describe
only what happens below the diagonal where the North is human capital rich.
Thus, the area between the diagonal and the ray (L/H)P give distributions of
factor endowments consistent with a world trade equilibrium of A-organizations
in which firms in the North choose the A-organization under autarky. Similarly,
the area between the ray (L/H)P and the ray (L/H)A give distributions of factor
endowments consistent with a world trade equilibrium of A-organizations in which
firms in the North choose either an A-organization or a P-organization. Finally,
the area between the ray (L/H)A and the bold line of the parallelogram give
distributions of factor endowments consistent with a world trade equilibrium of
A-organization in which firms in the North choose the P-organization. A similar
reasoning can be done from the perspective of the South. Thus, {P ;O} describes
the distribution of factor endowments at which N has a P -equilibrium and S has
an O-equilibrium under autarky. {A/P,O} describes a situation in which North
chooses either A-firms or P-firms, and South chooses O-firms.
As the factor content of consumption can be represented by a point on the
diagonal, the volume of intersectoral trade increases with the distance to the
diagonal. The further away from the diagonal the endowment point of the two
countries, the larger the difference between North and South in factor composition
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and thus the larger the volume of trade. Thus, organizational convergence is the
more likely the more dissimilar the two countries and the larger their trade volume.
L
H
4.2. Corporate Organization and the Pattern of Trade
So far we have examined how international trade is affecting corporate organiza-
tion in the North and in the South. We turn now to corporate organization as a
source of trade. In general, international trade is determined here by differences
in factor proportions and by differences in labor productivity between N and S
when they happen to start with different corporate organization under autarky
like the P -organization and the O-organization, respectively as drawn in Figure
2. The factor endowment of the country determines the mode of organization its
firms choose which, in turn, determines the level of productivity in the X-sector.
Consider, however, the case when the countries are endowed with factor en-
dowments that happen to fall in the range of mixed equilibria [(L/H)M , (L/H)O].
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In this range of relative factor endowments N and S will have different factor en-
dowments with the same factor prices. They will, however, still trade with one
another because of different corporate organization. The North located in the
left region of [(L/H)M , (L/H)O] will have a mix of A-firms and O-firms in which
A-firms dominate. In the South located in the right region of [(L/H)M , (L/H)O]
the O-firms will dominate among A-firms and O-firms. When North and South
start to trade, North moves to more O-firm in the integrated world economy and
releases some skilled labor. This, in turn, relaxes the resource constraint on tal-
ent. More firms find a skilled manager to start a firm and thus more varieties
are produced and exported to South. South moves to more A-firms as a result
of trade integration thereby releasing unskilled labor which is employed in the
Y -sector. As a result, S imports varieties from N which are paid for by exports of
Y -goods to N . In the region of mixed equilibria international trade has no effect
on goods and factor prices. However, N and S still benefit from trade due to an
increased varieties of goods.
Consider further the case when the countries are endowed with factor endow-
ments that happen to fall in the range of multiple equilibria [(L/H)A, (L/H)P ]. In
this range of factor endowments N is only slighty richer in skilled labor compared
to S. They may, however, have different corporate organization under autarky
because firms’ mode of organization depends on the organizational decision taken
by other firms in the X-sector. Thus, firms in N might choose the P -organization
and firms in S might opt for the A-organization. As a result, firms in the North
will be more productive and the North will have a lower relative wage for skilled
labor q/w both because it is richer in skills and because of using a more unskilled
labor intensive mode of organization. In the South, A-firms will be less produc-
tive in production and South’s relative wage for skilled labor will be higher both
because it is less rich in skills and because it is using a more skill intensive or-
ganization. After trade integration different equilibria may occur. With factor
price equalization in the two countries, one region will adopt the corporate orga-
nization of the other region depending on the coordination of expectations. This
may result in merger waves (a shift from an A-organization to a P -organization)
when S adopts North’s corporate organization or in waves of outsourcing (a move
from a P -organization to an A-organization) when N adopts South’s mode of
organization.11
11Note, however, that trade equilibria without factor price equalization may exist as well. Each
country may produce varieties of the X-good with its corporate organization under autarky
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4.3. Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a general equilibrium model of trade with differ-
entiated and homogenous goods in which firms endogenously choose their mode
of organization. The optimal firm organization is determined by the trade off
between control of top management and the initiative of middle management.
Depending on who has power in the firm we distinguish between three types of
organizations: the P-organization in which power is concentrated at the top of the
corporate hierarchy (integration), the A-organization in which the talented divi-
sion manager runs the firm (outsourcing), and the single managed O-organization
without an internal hierarchy in which the firm is run without the talented man-
ager’s cooperation. There are two sources of comparative advantage in our model.
The factor endownment of a country determines factor prices and with it the pro-
duction and start-up costs of firms. The mode of organization determines the
productivity and the skill intensity of firms. Hence, international trade is driven
by differences in factor endowments, differences in the level of productivity, and
differences in corporate organization across countries.
By making entry attractive, trade integration leads to a ’war for talent’ in
which entering firms compete with incumbent firms for scarce manager talent to
start a firm. This, in turn, bids up the wage for manager talent and with it the
start up costs of firms. As the stakes rise, the CEO of the corporation gets more
involved in internal affairs of the firm potentially destroying her manager’s initia-
tive. To prevent this from happening the CEO delegates power to her talented
manager and the ’talent firm’ emerges as an equilibrium. Trade integration puts
pressure on the demand for skills in rich economies for two novel reasons. First,
because trade creates the ’war for talent’. Second, because trade leads to an econ-
omy wide shift in corporate organization from a low skill intensive organization
(the P -firm in North and the O-firm in South) to a skill intensive organization
(the A-firm). The organizational change towards skill intensive firms raises the
relative demand for human capital. Furthermore, trade integration leads to con-
vergence in corporate cultures across countries. The integrated world economy
moves to an organizational equilibrium with flatter corporate hierarchies in which
(P -firms in North and A-firms in South) without organizational convergence. Under these
circumstances, North firms will be more productive in the X-sector than South firms. The
model then generates endogenous differences in productivity levels due to different corporate
cultures across countries with Ricardian features of trade.
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human capital has power in the corporation. Waves of outsourcing result as the
world economy reorganizes and converges to the organizational equilibrium of the
’talent firm’. The described organizational convergence across countries will be
the more likely, the more countries differ in factor endowments and thus the more
they trade with one another.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 (Marin and Verdier 2002)
We first compute the Nash equilibrium efforts and the corresponding payoffs
under the P-organization and under the A-organization. Then we compare the
optimal organization from the principal’s point of view
• Nash equilibrium efforts under a P organization
Consider first the case in which the principal has formal power in the firm.
The two parties’ expected relevant payoffs are:
uP = EB + (1−E)eαB − wE2
uA = Eβb+ (1−E)eb− ke)
The first order conditions of the two parties are
Principal: B(1− eα) = 2wE
Agent:
e = e if k ≤ b(1−E)
= 0 if k > b(1− E)
Selecting the equilibrium preferred by the principal whenever there are multi-
ple equilibria the Nash equilibrium level of efforts under the P-organization is
a) e∗P = e, and E
∗
P =
B(1− eα)
2w
when B/w ≤ eBP (α)
b) e∗P = 0, and E
∗
P =
B
2w
when B/w > eBP (α)
with eBP (α) = 2(1− k/b)
1− eα
The equilibrium expected utility of the principal under the P-organization is
u∗P = E
∗
PB + (1− E∗P )e∗PαB − w(E∗P )2
= w(E∗P )
2 + e∗PαB
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• Nash equilibrium efforts under an A-organization
Consider now the case where the principal has delegated decision control to
the agent and thus the agent has formal authority. Now the principal is prevented
from overruling the agent’s decision when both have acquired information. The
two parties’ expected payoffs are:
vP = eαB + (1− e)EB − wE2
vA = eb+ (1− e)Eβb− ke
The analysis is similar to the one for the P-organization. We get the following
characterization of the Nash equilibrium effort levels
a) e∗A = e and E
∗
A =
B(1− e)
2w
when B/w ≤ eBA
b) e∗A = 0 and E
∗
A =
B
2w
when B/w > eBA
with eBA = 2(1− k/b)
β(1− e)eBA is the critical profit level at which the agent’s initiative is killed under the
A-organization.
Note that eBA = 2(1− k/b)
β(1− e) >
2(1− k/b)
1− eα =
eBP (α)
As eBA > eBP (α), A’s initiative is killed already at a lower profit level under the
P-organization than under the A-organization. The reason is that under the A-
firm the agent has formal authority and therefore has better effort incentives than
when the principal has formal authority.
The equilibrium expected utility of the principal under the P-organization is
ν∗P = e
∗
AαB + (1− e∗A)E∗AB − w(E∗A)2
= w(E∗A)
2 + e∗AαB
38
• Optimal Firm Organization
Three cases can be distinguished.
Case 1: B/w ≤ eBP (α) (low profits)
The utility levels of the principal under the two forms of organization are
simply
u∗P = w(E
∗
P )
2 + e∗PαB and v
∗
P = w(E
∗
A)
2 + e∗AαB
Given that e∗P = e
∗
A = e, and that E
∗
P > E
∗
A in this regime, it follows that
u∗P > v
∗
P . Thus, the P-organization dominates the A-organization.
Case 2: eBP (α) < B/w ≤ eBA (intermediate profits)
At this profit level, the P-organization kills the agent’s effort e∗P = 0, while he
exerts maximal effort e∗A = e under the A-organization. The principal’s expected
utilities under the two organizations, respectively are given by
u∗P =
B2
4w
and v∗P =
(1− e)2B2
4w
+ eαB
u∗P > v
∗
P and thus the principal prefers the P-firm over the A-firm when
B/w > B(α) =
4α
2− e
B(α) is the critical profit level at which the principal is indifferent between
the P-organization and the A-organization.
Case 3: eBA < B/w (high profits)
At this profit level there is again no trade off between control and initiative.
Both firm organizations kill the agent’s initiative and provide the same level of
control to the principal. Hence, they are just equivalent. However, if we allow
for the lowest agent’s effort e to be in the interval [e, e] with e small but strictly
positive, then the P-organization dominates the A-organization. Therefore, we
consider the P-firm to dominate the A-firm in this regime.
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In Marin and Verdier (2002), we discuss the equilibrium choice of organization
depending on the relative positions of eBP (α), B(α) and eBA. Here, in order to
concentrate on the most interesting case and to simplify the discussion, we assume
the following configuration of parameters
2(1− k/b)
1− eα <
4α
2− e <
2(1− k/b)
β(1− e)
implying that eBP (α) < B(α) < eBA. From the preceding discussion, the optimal
choice of organization is then as summarized in proposition 1 in the main text
• Characteristics of ΘP (Bw ),ΘA(Bw ) and Θ0(Bw ) under assumptions A.1
and A.2.
Recall that
L
H
=
νP
1−γ
³
B
w
´ h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
+
³
B
w
´2 (1−αe)2
4
νP
1−γ
³
B
w
´
a
1−a
[1−θL]
q/w
+ 1
which can be rewritten as
L
H
= Θ(νP
B
w
,
µ
B
w
¶2 (1− αe)2
4
, θL)
Θ is increasing in νPB/w if·
γ +
a
1− aθL
¸
−
µ
B
w
¶2 (1− eα)2
4
"
a
1− a
[1− θL]
q/w
#
> 0
or using (2.19)
·
γ +
a
1− aθL
¸
− a
1− a [1− θL]
³
B
w
´2 (1−eα)2
4³
B
w
´2 (1−eα)2
4
+ eα(B
w
)
> 0
This will hold when
h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
− a
1−a [1− θL] > 0. The last inequality will be
satisfied when assumption A.1 holds (ie. γ + a
1−a(2θL − 1) > 0).
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Also Θ is clearly increasing in B/w and in θL. Because of assumption A.2,
the elasticity of substitution σY between skilled and unskilled labor for good Y
is larger than 1. This implies that θL the cost share of unskilled labor in good
Y is increasing in q/w. Clearly Θ(.) is increasing in
³
B
w
´2
. Further, (2.10) shows
that νP is also an increasing function of Bw while (2.19) shows that q/w is also an
increasing function of B
w
. It follows that Θ(νP Bw ,
³
B
w
´2 (1−αe)2
4
, θL) can be written
as a function ΘP (Bw ) with ΘP (.) increasing in B/w.
The proof is similar for the two other functions ΘA(.) and Θ0(.) describing the
firm’s stakes consistent with factor market equilibrium in an A-equilibrium or an
O-equilibrium.
Substituting (2.9) ,(2.10), and (2.19) into Θ(νP Bw ,
³
B
w
´2
, θL) gives
ΘP (
B
w
) =
·
(1−eα)2
2
³
B
w
´2
+ eα(B
w
)
¸
1
1−γ
h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
+
³
B
w
´2 (1−αe)2
4h
(1−eα)2
2 (
B
w )+eα
i
h
(1−eα)2
4 (
B
w )+eα
i a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
Similarly, we get
ΘA(
B
w
) =
·
(1−e)2
2
³
B
w
´2
+ eα(B
w
)
¸
1
1−γ
h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
+
³
B
w
´2 (1−e)2
4h
(1−e)2
2 (
B
w )+eα
i
h
(1−e)2
4 (
B
w )+eα
i a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
(.1)
and
Θ0(
B
w
) =
1
2
³
B
w
´2
1
1−γ
h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
+
³
B
w
´2
1
4
2a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
(.2)
- First, as νP > νA, it follows that ΘP (Bw ) = Θ(νP
B
w
,
³
B
w
´2 (1−αe)2
4
, θL) >
Θ(νABw ,
³
B
w
´2 (1−e)2
4
, θL) = ΘA(Bw ) for all values of B/w ΘP (
B
w
) > ΘA(Bw ).
- Second, for small B/w, q/w is close to 0 (using the free entry conditions
(2.19), (2.20), and (2.21)) and
ΘP (
B
w
) ≈
eα 1
1−γ
h
γ + a
1−aθL(0)
i
a
1−a
[1−θL(0)]
1−γ + 1
B
w
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ΘA(
B
w
) ≈
eα 1
1−γ
h
γ + a
1−aθL(0)
i
a
1−a
[1−θL(0)]
1−γ + 1
B
w
and
Θ0(
B
w
) ≈
1
2
1
1−γ
h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
+ 1
4
2a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
µ
B
w
¶2
Hence, ΘP (Bw ) and ΘA(
B
w
) are first order in B/w, while Θ0(Bw ) is second order
in B/w. Therefore, for small B/w we get that Θ0(Bw ) < ΘA(
B
w
) < ΘP (Bw ).
- Third, for large enough B/w, q/w tends to ∞ and θL tends to 1. Hence,
ΘA(
B
w
) ≈ (1− e)
2
2
µ
B
w
¶2 1
1− γ
·
γ +
a
1− aθL
¸
+
µ
B
w
¶2 (1− e)2
4
and
Θ0(
B
w
) =
1
2
µ
B
w
¶2 1
1− γ
·
γ +
a
1− aθL
¸
+
µ
B
w
¶2 1
4
and it follows that Θ0(Bw ) > ΘA(
B
w
) for B/w large enough. Θ0(Bw ) crosses
ΘA(Bw ) at least once from below.
• Proof that ΘA(B(α)) < Θ0(B(α))
Recall that B(α) = 4α
2−e and that at this value the firm is indifferent between
the A-organization and the O-organization ie.
(1− e)2
4
(B(α))2 + eα(B(α)) =
1
4
(B(α))2 =
q
w
(.3)
Using (.1) and (.3), we get
Θ0(B(α)) =
1
2
³
B(α)
´2
1
1−γ
h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
+
³
B(α)
´2
1
4
2a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
=
Z + eα(B(α))
h
1 + 1
1−γ
h
γ + a
1−aθL
ii
W
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where
Z =
"
1
2
(1− e)2
2
(B(α))2 + eα(B(α))
#
1
1− γ
·
γ +
a
1− aθL
¸
+
(1− e)2
4
(B(α))2
and
W =
2a
1− a
[1− θL]
1− γ + 1
After substituting B(α) = 4α
2−e in Z and W, a straightforward but tedious
computation gives
Θ0(B(α)) =
4α2
(2−e)2
2
1−γ
h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
+ 1
2a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
(.4)
Similarly,
ΘA(B(α)) =
Z
W − 4eα
B(α)
a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ
which after some computations results again in
ΘA(B(α)) =
4α2
(2−e)2
h
1+(1−e)2
1−γ
³
γ + a
1−aθL
´
+ (1− e)2
i
2a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1− e(2− e)
a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ
(.5)
Comparing (.4) to (.5) is equivalent to compare
2
1−γ
h
γ + a
1−aθL
i
+ 1
2a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
to
1+(1−e)2
1−γ
³
γ + a
1−aθL
´
+ (1− e)2
a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ (1 + (1− e)2) + 1
Denote then the function
Ψ(y) =
h
1+y
1−γ
³
γ + a
1−aθL
´
+ y
i
a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ (1 + y) + 1
After differentiation Ψ0(y) has the sign ofÃ
1
1− γ
µ
γ +
a
1− aθL
¶
+ 1
!Ã
a
1− a
[1− θL]
1− γ + 1
!
− a
1− a
[1− θL]
1− γ
Ã
1
1− γ
µ
γ +
a
1− aθL
¶!
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orµµ
γ +
a
1− aθL
¶
+ 1− γ
¶µ
a
1− a [1− θL] + 1− γ
¶
− a
1− a [1− θL]
µ
γ +
a
1− aθL
¶
= (1− γ) a
1− a [1− θL] + (1− γ)
µ
γ +
a
1− aθL
¶
+ (1− γ)2 > 0
Hence, Ψ0(y) > 0 and
Ψ(1) > Ψ((1− e)2)
which implies in the end thatµ
L
H
¶
O
= Θ0(B(α)) > ΘA(B(α)) =
µ
L
H
¶
M
• Proof of the Rybczynski Theorem of Firm Organization
d(1− λ∗)
1− λ∗ >
d( L
H
)
L
H
> 0 >
dλ∗
λ∗
Denote first
ϕ =
HDA
HD0
Using the fact that (1−e)
2
4
(B(α)) + eα = 1
4
B(α), we get
ϕ =
h
(1−e)2
2 (B(α))+eα
i
h
(1−e)2
4 (B(α))+eα
i a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
2a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
=
[ 12(B(α))−eα]
1
4
B(α)
a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
2a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
= 1−
4eα
B(α)
a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ
2a
1−a
[1−θL]
1−γ + 1
Thus,
ϕ =
HDA
HD0
< 1
Denote L/H = x, (L/H)O = xO, and (L/H)M = xM . Then, by definition
µ =
xO − x
xO − xM
< 1
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and
1− λ∗ = (1− µ)H
D
A
(1− µ)HDA + µHD0
=
ϕ(1− µ)
µ(1− ϕ) + ϕ
Differentiation results in
d(1− λ∗)
1− λ∗ =
−dµ
1− µ −
(1− ϕ)dµ
µ(1− ϕ) + ϕ
=
−dµ
(1− µ)[µ(1− ϕ) + ϕ]
while
dµ
µ
=
−dx
xO − x
From this follows that
d(1− λ∗)
1− λ∗ =
µdx
(1− µ)[µ(1− ϕ) + ϕ](xO − x)
=
xO − x
xO − xM
xO − xM
(x− xM)[µ(1− ϕ) + ϕ](xO − x)
dx
=
x
x− xM
1
(µ(1− ϕ) + ϕ)
dx
x
Given that µ(1− ϕ) + ϕ < 1, it follows that
d(1− λ∗)
1− λ∗ >
dx
x
> 0 >
dλ∗
λ∗
which proves part iii) of proposition 3.
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